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Abstract—Using traffic and passenger itinerary data for the 
European network, the cost resilience of four mechanisms, with 
phased stakeholder uptake, has been assessed under explicit, 
local and disperse disturbance: industrial action and weather. A 
novel cost resilience metric has demonstrated logical properties 
and captured cost impacts sensitively. Of these mechanisms, only 
A-CDM has been cost-benefit analysed in SESAR, yet the other
three each demonstrate particular utility. Flight-, passenger- and
cost-centric metrics are deployed to assess the mechanisms, with
fully costed results presented, based on extensive industry
consultation. Initial work on assessing mechanism payback
periods has begun.
Keywords–cost-benefit; disturbance; resilience; resilience 
metrics; stakeholder uptake; strategic investment 
I. INTRODUCTION
The main objective of the ComplexityCosts project [1] is to 
gain deeper insights into air traffic management (ATM) 
performance trade-offs for different stakeholders’ investment 
mechanisms within the context of uncertainty. Despite 
uncertainty being one of the main factors generating reduced 
performance, behaviours are often driven by complex 
interactions and feedback loops that render it difficult to assess 
second-order impacts at a network level. The ComplexityCosts 
simulation model takes into account different stakeholders, 
according to corresponding tactical and strategic cost 
structures, and their interactions. This paper describes the 
implementation of the mechanisms and their cost assignments, 
at the tactical and strategic levels. Stakeholders’ mechanism 
adoption is modelled according to three uptake levels: baseline 
(current situation), early adopters (mid-term) and followers 
(longer-term). 
Uncertainty (and network performance detriment) is 
modelled by disturbances introduced into the simulation: the 
statistical models for the explicit disturbance types of industrial 
actions and weather are presented. Background (including air 
traffic flow management, ATFM) disturbance is also modelled 
as part of the baseline. The statistical parameters for these 
disturbances are derived from empirical data, including their 
spatial and temporal duration. The effect of the disturbances 
will be variously mitigated by the mechanisms. Different 
mechanisms might deliver different performance as a function 
of the spatial distribution of the disturbances. In some cases, a 
mechanism might be better suited for localised disturbances in 
the network, but provide a lower benefit when disturbances 
affect the network in a wider manner. For this reason, each 
disturbance is modelled with two different spatial scopes: local 
and disperse. 








1 Improving sector capacity with ATCOa hours en-route ANSPb magnitude 
2 Dynamic cost indexing (DCI) en-route airline cost 
3 A-CDMc airport airport magnitude 
4 Improved passenger reaccommodation airport airline cost 
a. Air traffic controller.
b. Air navigation service provider.
c. Airport collaborative decision making.
Table 1 shows the location focus (physical manifestation of 
the mechanism) and from where the primary strategic 
investment in the mechanism originates, noting that for (1) and 
(2) the main investor is not the airline, although it is the major
beneficiary. Although airline delay magnitudes and delay costs
are intimately related, the mechanisms focus more specifically
on either the delay magnitude, or delay cost (final column).
The latter applies when airline delay costs are (in theory at
least) available at the decision-making point during tactical
implementation of the mechanism (i.e. airlines applying DCI or
controlling passenger reaccommodation tools). Most of the
investment mechanism costs are expected to be paid for
strategically (i.e. as sunk costs). However, we must also take
account of any tactical (‘running’) costs associated with the
mechanisms – such as variable fuel burn during aircraft delay
recovery with DCI. Such costs are examined later. The most
comprehensive, consolidated source of cost benefit analyses for
SESAR is available through the proposal on the content of a
pilot common project [4], which includes A-CDM as an
enabler for deployment of the ATM functionality (AF) “airport
integration and throughput functionalities”. Further cost data
on A-CDM per se are available in EUROCONTROL reporting
[2, 3], and the availability of some cost data for this mechanism
was a significant factor in its inclusion in the final list (Table
1). ComplexityCosts aims to extend, complement and compare
such high-level analyses through the detailed simulations
reported herewith. In previous work [16] we quantified the cost
effectiveness of adding controller hours to area control centre
regulations to avert the delay cost impact on airlines, whereby
we also summarised the limited literature on this topic. This
underpins some of the work developed here for mechanism (1).
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Mechanisms (2) and (4) have not been hitherto evaluated in 
the manner presented here, due in no small part to the difficulty 
of accessing the necessary confidential cost data from industry 
and of modelling them. 
Before moving on to the detailed reporting of this paper, we 
close the introduction with some necessary definitions. The 
combination of a disturbance, mechanism and stakeholder 
uptake level, along with the corresponding input traffic and 
passenger itineraries, is referred to as a ‘scenario’, thus 
comprising 40 in total, plus the corresponding baselines. 
Having cause to frequently refer to ‘disturbance’, we define 
this at the outset as an event, either internal or external to a 
system, capable of causing the system to change its specified 
(stable or unstable) state, as determined by one or more 
metrics. A disturbance may thus potentially cause (or 
aggravate) a disruption. A disruption is an event where normal 
operations are significantly degraded. The term ‘resilience’ is 
central to the research, and is investigated in the following 
section. Section III then summarises key features of the model, 
with the first simulation results presented in Section IV. 
Conclusions and future research comprise Section V. 
II. QUANTIFYING RESILIENCE 
A. Qualitative foundations 
Before being in a position to quantify resilience, it is first 
necessary to have a qualitative definition. This section 
summarises work presented in [1]. As pointed out in a recent 
review [8], too many different definitions, concepts and 
approaches are being used, such that: “ […] some definitions of 
resilience overlap significantly with a number of already 
existing concepts like robustness, fault-tolerance, flexibility, 
survivability and agility.” An overview of the evolution of the 
term in various fields of research is presented in [9], and a 
thorough review with numerous ATM examples has recently 
been published [5]. The first two milestones (see Table II) in 
the development of the term were its initial introduction in 
material testing [10] and the later adoption in ecology [19]. The 
latter led to widespread use of the term in the scientific 
literature. A third important milestone with relevance to air 
transport was the ‘resilience engineering’ paradigm introduced 
in 2006 [11], which led to (broader) qualitative modelling of 
resilience in ATM, from 2009 [12]. 
TABLE II.  THREE MAJOR DEFINITIONS OF RESILIENCE 









inherent ability of the 



















safety-based design of 
socio-technical systems 
The earlier ‘engineering resilience’ assumes one stable state 
only, with resilience being the ability to return to this original 
state, after disturbance. Ecological resilience, in contrast, refers 
to absorbing disturbance and access to multiple (stable or 
equivalent) states. An air transport system may also operate in 
(essentially) equivalent states of safety or cost. The latter is the 
focus of ComplexityCosts, with safety being out of scope at 
this stage. 
TABLE III.  THREE CAPACITIES OF RESILIENCE 




network can withstand 
disruption 
robustness; little or no change 
may be apparent 
strategic 
Adaptive flows through the network 
can be reaccommodated 





Restorative recovery enabled within time 
and cost constraints 
may focus on dynamics/targets; 
amenable to analytical treatment 
tactical 
 
A recent systematic review [13] across numerous domains, 
categorised three capacities of resilience, viz.: absorptive, 
adaptive, and restorative. These are summarised in Table III. 
The ‘key feature’ (second column) is taken from [14], to which 
we have appended some key associations and main ATM 
phases with which the capacity may be typically associated. 
From a performance-focused perspective, reliability may be 
considered as the presence of all three capacities; vulnerability 
may be considered as the absence of any one of them. For 
clarity of reference and to accommodate a definition of 
robustness within our framework, we align robustness with the 
inherent strength or resistance to withstand stresses beyond 
normal limits, i.e. the absorptive capacity of resilience. In [1], 
we also discussed (practically) instantaneous recovery, 
associated with (schedule) buffers and ‘buffer energy’. As will 
be expanded upon later in this paper, ComplexityCosts 
embraces all three capacities, taking into account both the 
strategic and tactical phases, with flow (aircraft and passenger) 
reaccommodation central to the model. 
B. Quantitative developments 
We have previously presented (ibid.) a quantitative 
discussion of resilience using state diagrams. Developing a 
metric for resilience, [8] commences with the formulation (1), 
where Я(t) is the resilience of a system at time t. This describes 
the ratio of recovery at time t to loss suffered by the system due 
to a disruption event at time td. If the recovery is equal to the 
loss, the system is fully resilient; if there is no recovery, no 
resilience is exhibited. ([7] uses similar ratios in the urban 






The authors [8] go on to define a quantitative ‘figure-of-
merit’ function, which specifies a system-level delivery metric. 
It is time-dependent and changes as the system state changes. 
Equation (1) is expanded (ibid.) to embrace a conditional 
figure-of-merit under a given disruptive event, and then further 
conceptually extended to include the time and costs required to 
restore the disrupted components. Such situations are 
illustrated with specific regard to investment mechanisms in 
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result in a reduction of the tactical magnitude of the disruption 
from a given disturbance, in addition to speeding up the system 
recovery. Such expenditures are defined as “resilience-
enhancing investments”. An extensive paper [15] reporting on 
an optimisation procedure for the restorative activities 
associated with the bridges of an urban network severely 
damaged by an earthquake, cites a normalised integral over 
time as a “broadly accepted” formulation of resilience. This is 
dimensionless and takes values in the range [0%, 100%]. For 
wider reviews of resilience metrics, see [5] and [13]. 
C. Novel cost resilience metric 
In this section, we summarise the derivation of a novel cost 
resilience metric, RC, which will be used to characterise the 
effectiveness of the ComplexityCosts mechanisms, in Section 
IV. Further details and early evaluations were presented in [1]. 
In order to take account of the time dependency when 
measuring resilience, causal summations, with specific regard 
to the mechanism and disturbance applied, are proposed. The 
precise time over which a given recovery occurs is difficult to 
assign, since propagation effects persist over many causally 
linked rotations during the (post disturbance) operational day. 
One operational day in the European airspace (see Section 
III(A) is thus used as the boundary condition for the analyses. 
The summation over events causally affected by the 
mechanism are denoted Σm, and as Σd for the disturbances. 
This allows specific assessment of the mechanism, relative to 
the effect of the disturbances. The cost resilience metric, by 
design, fully comprises cost-based components, as a result of 
the selection only of mechanisms that can be monetised. The 
tactical cost associated with a disrupted flight or passenger at 
time t in the absence of a mechanism is denoted Cu(t), and in 
the presence of a mechanism as 𝐶𝑢
𝑚(𝑡). It is also necessary to 
take account of any tactical costs associated with ‘running’ 
each mechanism, Cm(t). (The example of variable fuel burn 
during aircraft delay recovery with DCI was cited in Section I, 
and such costs are detailed further in Section III(D)3). The final 
formulation for the cost resilience metric is presented as (2), 
with constraints (3)1. Perfect resilience (complete cost 
recovery) gives RC = 1; no recovery gives RC = 0. If the 
mechanism were to induce greater costs than the disturbance 




𝑢  −  ∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑢
𝑚(𝑡)𝑚
𝑑






 ∑ 𝐶𝑢(𝑡) > 0;
𝑑
𝑢    ∑ ∑ 𝐶𝑢
𝑚(𝑡)𝑚
𝑑
𝑢 ,   ∑ 𝐶𝑚(𝑡)𝑚 ≥ 0 
Such that: 
 𝑅𝐶 ≤ 1 
                                                          
1 The first term in (3), i.e. the total cost of the disturbance, could in theory 
be zero. An example would be a relatively small disturbance fully absorbed by 
schedule buffer, due to robustness. However, only disturbances with some 
positive tactical cost will be modelled, such that we exclude zero values. 
Whilst simple ratios furnish straightforward metrics, they 
may also be misleading2. The number of assessment units (u, 
such as flights or passengers) should thus also be cited in their 
reporting, as with p values in statistical significance testing. 
The simple discipline of reporting “RC = 0.50 (n = 10)” c.f. 
“RC = 0.50 (n = 1 000)” (n = Σ u) at least gives immediate 
insight that the latter had the wider reach. 
III. THE COMPLEXITYCOSTS MODEL  
A. Overview of the model 
The ComplexityCosts model is a stochastic, layered 
network model that includes interacting elements and feedback 
loops. Stochastic elements include the baseline and explicit 
disturbance types, as previously introduced. (Note that, in 
contrast, the resilience models presented in the literature review 
were all deterministic.) 12SEP14, a busy traffic day, free of 
exceptional delays, strikes or adverse weather, forms the 
baseline simulation day, modelling major traffic and passenger 
flows to, from and within the European airspace. Flights were 
extracted from the Demand Data Repository (DDR2) dataset, 
with schedule data added from Innovata, and the database was 
then cleaned (e.g. to remove circular, positioning, light aircraft, 
all-cargo, and military flights). Each model scenario includes 
26 860 flights. 
Fuel consumption models are based on Base of Aircraft 
Data (BADA4) and Performance Engineering Program 
(Airbus) data, the latter being used to validate trajectory 
modifications due to tactical speed adjustments. The model 
also includes en-route wind modelling based on average cruise 
winds estimated from the trajectories.  
Auxiliary power unit (APU) fuel burn allocations are as per 
[17]. CO2 estimates are produced for at-gate (including engine 
fuel burn) and airborne flight phases (kg-fuel being multiplied 
by the standard factor of 3.16 to obtain kg-CO2). The cost of 
fuel is assigned as 0.8 EUR/kg for the nominal cost scenarios 
(and 0.9 EUR/kg for the high cost scenario used within the DCI 
mechanism). Notwithstanding the multiple additional features 
implemented, as described below, much of the model’s 
underlying framework and operational rules are similar to the 
‘POEM’ model [6], which also includes at-gate turnaround 
recoveries based on historical data. The fuller model features 
will be reported separately. 
The model is written in MATLAB, using statistical, parallel 
and simulation packages, with extensive pre-processing. On a 
Quad 2.4 GHz, 64-bit core processor with 4GB of available 
RAM, a single scenario run takes between 5 and 20 minutes, 
depending on its complexity. An Amazon-cloud grid of five 
supercomputers (EC2 m4.4xlarge) was deployed, the grid 
allowing data-sharing of simulation results in real-time. A full 
run, with all scenarios and baselines, takes 12 hours. The first 
results, presented in this paper, are typically based on 30 model 
runs per scenario. 
                                                          
2 Take a simple example relating to equation (1): a €50 recovery of a 
€100 disruption. This would yield the same simple resilience ratio as a €50k 
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B. Passenger itinerary assignments 
The allocation of passengers to flights, with connecting 
itineraries and fares, is an important part of the model both 
with regard to the output metrics and mechanisms associated 
with passenger service delivery. In-house itineraries for 2010 
were used as a starting point. The generation of the passenger 
itineraries deploys three datasets: individual itineraries for one 
day in September 2010 (used in the ‘POEM’ model [6]); 
aggregated September 2010 International Air Transport 
Association (IATA) itineraries (‘PaxIS’ data); and, a sample of 
anonymised, individual itineraries from September 2014 
provided by a global distribution system (GDS) service 
provider. In order to calibrate the data to September 2014, 
aggregated passenger data from Airports Council International 
(ACI) EUROPE and Eurostat passenger flows were considered 
alongside published airline load factors. Overall, passenger 
growth, from 2010, was around 13% (according to Eurostat 
data). 
For each individual passenger’s target itinerary, all possible 
options were computed considering the available flights on 
12SEP14. This computation ensured that passenger itineraries 
with more than one leg were able to make their connection at 
the intermediate airport(s), whilst respecting the minimum 
connecting time (MCT). These options were then preference-
scored based on a set of parameters that include the 
characteristics of the airlines used on multi-leg itineraries (e.g. 
airlines being members of the same alliance, or partners within 
an airline group), total itinerary duration and waiting times at 
connecting airports (where applicable). 
Respecting the available seating capacity on each aircraft, 
itineraries were assigned iteratively, and probabilistically – to 
ensure that the final assignment reflected the variability 
observed in actual operations. After this assignment, there was 
a capacity evaluation to ensure that all flights were within their 
targeted load factor: if required, some itineraries were thus 
(stochastically) removed from flights. After this process, 
unallocated, target itineraries were assigned. 
This iterative process ran sequentially for each of the three 
data sources. At the end of the process, flights still requiring 
passengers were allocated new itineraries generated based 
partly on the characteristics of existing passengers’ itineraries. 
Finally, a fare and passenger type (‘premium’ / ‘standard’) 
allocation was made (see Section III(D)2(d)). In total, there are 
over 3 million passengers in the modelled day, each with an 
assigned itinerary. 
C. Differential stakeholder uptake 
New technologies and tools are rarely adopted 
simultaneously by all users or stakeholders. Although high-
level roadmaps have been developed within the ATM Master 
Plan [18] and the pilot common project [4], the 
ComplexityCosts model seeks to refine the relationship 
between selected mechanisms and stakeholder uptake, in the 
context of performance assessment. 
Three uptake levels are considered for each of the 
mechanisms: baseline, early adopters and followers. In the 
baseline, the current concept of operation is captured, while the 
uptake of the early adopters and followers incorporates the 
further development of more advanced mechanisms. Each 
uptake level includes the preceding level(s). Baseline 
mechanisms are implemented in all the scenarios, e.g. the 
simplest delay recovery rules of dynamic cost indexing are 
always in place for a limited number of flights (see Section 
III(D)2(b)), reflecting current practice. 
In general, early adopters are a subset of stakeholders 
implementing the mechanism, often only in a subset of their 
operations. For follower uptake, other stakeholders incorporate 
the mechanism and early adopters widen their use and/or 
enhance its performance. This is discussed further in the next 
section. 
D. Selecting the mechanisms and assigning the costs 
1) Mechanism selection 
The rationale for the selection of the mechanisms 
introduced in Table 1 was presented in [1]. A focus was 
maintained on fairly discrete and stakeholder-scalable 
mechanisms, rather than high-level instruments such as 
Functional Airspace Blocks. Mechanisms likely to be used as 
market-based responses to air transport evolution were also in 
scope, even if not explicitly part of the ATM Master Plan. 
Sources for costs were a primary consideration, as these are 
limited, and, without them, the metrics cannot be evaluated. 
2) Mechanism implementation and uptake 
a) Improving sector capacity with ATCO hours 
As presented in [16], in some cases, ATFM delays may be 
reduced if ANSPs enhance their operations and manage to 
avert airspace regulations declared due to staff shortage. This 
mechanism is similarly implemented as a reduction of ATFM 
regulation in the airspaces that experience increase in demand 
due to aircraft re-routing to avoid a disturbance (e.g., traffic 
circumventing a region affected by industrial action). 
Delay is typically generated for such flights since such 
regulations are not averted by the mechanism. The early 
adopter uptake considers two ANSPs implementing this 
mechanism (Maastricht Upper Area Control Centre and the 
UK) and in the follower uptake four more ANSPs are 
incorporated (those of Germany, Spain, France and Poland). 
b) DCI 
In the baseline implementation, a simple recovery rule 
applies of attempting to recover as much delay as possible 
when the delay exceeds 15 minutes at top of climb (TOC). This 
is applied to 10% of flights. It applies to flights of longer than 
60 minutes and sets caps on extra fuel consumption. In the 
enhanced mechanism, the cost (fuel) and benefit (delay 
reduction) of recovering delay is estimated at TOC for all 
flights implementing the mechanism. This applies to carriers’ 
operations on flights to/from their main hubs, for the three 
largest European airports by passenger numbers in 2014: 
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scenario, the number of airlines implementing the mechanism 
on operations to/from their hub increases (by a further eight 
airlines, including two low-cost carriers) and the airlines from 
the early adopters implement the mechanism in the rest of their 
network. 
c) A-CDM 
Based on [2] and [3], the benefit of implementing A-CDM 
is modelled as a reduction of the propagation of delay at the 
airport using distributions centred on 3% or 4% reductions. 
This reduction is expected as more predictability is achieved 
and resources are better managed. The benefits are staggered: 
baseline airports achieve 3% on average, these maturing to 4% 
in subsequent uptake levels; early adopters achieve 3%, these 
maturing to 4% at the follower uptake level, at which newly 
implementing airports achieve 3%. The uptake of airports 
follows the departure planning information (DPI) 
implementation at airports as reported by EUROCONTROL3. 
d) Improved pax reaccomodation 
The baseline models a local, airport-by-airport solution, 
where disrupted passengers missing connections are reallocated 
to subsequent flights, possibly with different routings, taking 
account of available space on such flights. This process simply 
minimises the cost of reaccommodating the passengers. 
Rebooking occurs firstly on the same airline, then within 
alliances, wherever possible. ‘Premium’ passengers (highest-
yield passengers associated with high-end fares) are 
reaccommodated first. The enhanced mechanism includes 
proactive management of outbound flights by implementing 
wait-for-passengers rules, that minimises the cost in a network-
wide (c.f. baseline, local) approach. The uptake mimics that of 
DCI: early adopters are major carriers for operations at their 
hub, whilst follower uptake includes the expansion of 
operations to their whole network and adds other airlines at 
their hubs. 
3) Mechanism cost assignments 
This section briefly summarises the detailed methodology 
developed for assigning the strategic (implementation) and 
tactical (‘running’) costs of the mechanisms. Several of these 
costs are presented in Section IV(A), where commercial 
sensitivities permit. 
a) Improving sector capacity with ATCO hours 
For this mechanism, the stakeholder making the investment 
is the ANSP (although this could be (partially) recovered later 
through airline user charges). The strategic cost is estimated 
from industry consultation as in the range EUR 1–3M per 
ANSP4, which we have scaled by ANSP size (number of 
ATCOs). The tactical costing follows the methodology of [16], 
assuming that full (i.e. not partial) shifts of controllers are 
required and by estimating ATCO ‘shortfalls’ with respect to 
the maximum possible number at each ANSP based on analysis 
of data from Aeronautical Information Regulation and Control 
                                                          
3 DPI Implementation Progress for CDM Airports, 
http://www.eurocontrol.int/articles/cdm-airports (Accessed July 2016). 
4 This is a software implementation cost for improved ATCO shift 
management, inter alia. 
(AIRAC) period 1313 to 1413. The tactical cost of controllers’ 
hours is based on [20]. 
b) DCI 
 Equipment and training costs are estimated for the strategic 
cost of implementing dynamic cost indexing. Class 2 (or 
higher) electronic flight bags (EFBs) are required to operate 
DCI. Based on expert industry consultation, an even 
distribution of Class 2 EFB uptake across 50% of European 
aircraft equipped with Class 1 EFBs is assumed. 40% of 
aircraft are assumed to be already equipped with Class 2 EFBs, 
and 10% with Class 3. Therefore, for 50% of aircraft that 
implement DCI, the cost of upgrading to Class 2 EFBs is 
considered. The training required is estimated at two hours per 
pilot affected by the implementation of the mechanism. Fleet 
pilot numbers are estimated from the airlines’ operations data, 
differentiating by the type of aircraft used. An estimation of the 
number of pilots operating routes affected by DCI is also used 
to compute the training costs. Following industry charging 
practice, the tactical cost of DCI is computed as a (fixed) 
percentage of the estimated benefit (net cost saving) to the 
airline. 
c) A-CDM 
The majority of the implementation costs for A-CDM are 
invested by the airport, handling agents and ANSP. These vary 
by airport size. Airline costs are mainly incurred by the major 
carrier at the airport, and are substantially less than for the 
airport (especially for smaller carriers). Explicit values 
collectively for all non-airline, and airline, stakeholders are 
estimated based on [2], [3] and industry consultation. Tactical 
costs are similarly derived. 
d) Improved pax reaccommodation  
The strategic cost of implementing the system is estimated 
based on industry consultation and proportional to the volume 
of passengers boarded yearly by the corresponding airlines. It 
is assumed that early adopter airlines already operate passenger 
reaccommodation software (irregular operations (IROPS) 
systems). For these early adopters, the software is assumed to 
be an upgrade of existing software, with the suppliers’ costs 
recuperated through the normal tactical charging regime. 
Implementation costs (again based on industry consultation) 
are applied to the follower airlines, however, these being based 
on airline size and within set cost constraints. The tactical costs 
of running the system are based on the number of passengers 
boarded by the implementing airlines (on the simulation day), 
as per industry practice. (Note that this charging philosophy is 
similar to that of DCI.) 
E. Types of disturbance 
1) Overview, and re-routing 
As introduced earlier, explicit disturbance types of 
industrial actions and weather are part of the model scenarios, 
both at local and disperse levels. Background (including 
ATFM) disturbance is also modelled as part of the baseline. 
For the explicit disturbances, except the local weather 
disturbances impacting specific airports, flights affected by the 
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 avoid the ATFM delay. Re-routing uses historical data of 
actual flight plans and waypoints, and an A* search algorithm 
(widely used in pathfinding between multiple nodes) to find the 
shortest, viable new route. Points within the boundaries of the 
ATFM regulations are withdrawn from the graph before 
computing the new route. Fig. 1 presents two examples of 
possible re-routings around French industrial action. ANSPs 
implementing additional ATFM regulations to manage the 
extra flow resulting from re-routings are also accounted for, 
consistent with a posteriori analysis of industrial action days. 
Figure 1.  Example of re-routing around industrial action. 
For the explicitly considered disturbances, the delay 
generated is approximated by Burr distributions based on 
analysis of all the regulations of the corresponding four 
disturbance categories for AIRAC 1313–1413. The 
geographical location of these ATFM regulations and their 
temporal durations are based on regulations implemented on 
specific days. In this analysis, the number of ANSPs affected 
and the intensity of the delay generated have been considered. 
Outline details of each delay model are presented as follows. 
2) Background (baseline) disturbance 
Background ATFM delay is based on the delay observed 
for 12SEP14 (the baseline simulation day), as reported in the 
corresponding DDR2 data, considering flights entering each 
regulation. The delay that a regulation generates is randomly 
shuffled between flights affected by the regulation, both to 
preserve the original distribution and also introduce a degree of 
stochasticity. Non-ATFM background delay is also modelled, 
taking account of aggregated (September 2014 [21] and full-
year 2014 [22]) primary and reactionary delay categorisations. 
3) Industrial actions 
The analysis of delay generated by industrial actions during 
the period AIRAC 1313–1413, and of various data sources 
(post-operational reports and Central Office for Delays 
Analysis (CODA, EUROCONTROL)), allows us to model the 
corresponding Burr delay distributions and to assign increased 
probabilities of flight cancellations and re-routing. 
 
a) Local 
These regulations’ locations and temporal durations are 
based on ATFM regulations implemented on 24JUN14, when 
major industrial action was implemented in French airspace. 
The effect is large but limited to the region of the French 
ANSP. 
b) Disperse 
For the disperse case, regulations due to industrial actions 
on 30JAN14 are considered. On that day, there was industrial 
action declared in the airspaces of Austria, France, Hungary 
Portugal and Slovakia. 
4) Weather  
Two distributions of delay are used: one for ATFM 
regulations at airports and another for ATFM regulations in the 
airspace. The values of the Burr distributions and the 
probabilities of having delay assigned are different in each 
case. For the airspace case re-routing is also possible. 
a) Local 
ATFM regulations due to weather on 18OCT14 are used. 
The selection of this day gives us a local geographical scope 
focused at airports. The regulations were localised at airports in 
Germany, Switzerland and the UK. 
b) Disperse 
25JUL14 was selected as a day when ATFM regulations 
were implemented in the airspace at a disperse geographical 
scale: six airports were affected in three ANSPs (Poland, 
Portugal and Switzerland) and 36 regulations were applied in 
the French, German, MUAC, Portuguese, Spanish and UK 
airspace. 
F. Airline cost impacts 
The tactical cost of delay to the airlines is the fundamental 
cost impact assessed in this research. (In future, it may be 
extended to other stakeholders.) Summing across the 
contributing tactical component cost types for assessment units 
(u) as a function of delay duration (t), furnishes Cu(t), thus 
enabling an evaluation of (2) for each model scenario, as 
reported in the results of Section IV. The main costs of airline 
delay are comprised of fuel, passenger, maintenance, crew and 
(strategically) fleet costs. Produced partly within the remit of 
ComplexityCosts, new delay cost values have been calculated 
[17] as an update to those published by the University of 
Westminster for the reference year 2010, extended to fifteen 
aircraft types, and based on an airline consultation specifically 
regarding the cost of passenger delay to the airline, since this 
comprises such a significant proportion of delay costs and is 
the most difficult to estimate (we thus elaborate on this next). 
Passenger, crew and maintenance costs draw directly on [17]. 
Fuel models were discussed in Section III(A). The passenger 
cost assessment draws on various sources of evidence, with a 
particular focus on the impact of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 
[23] and proposed amendments thereto. This regulation 
establishes the rules for compensation and assistance to airline 
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In addition to these hard costs of delay, the soft costs of 
passenger delay (associated primarily with market share loss 
driven through unpunctuality) are also applied. The rules 
governing Regulation 261 compensation payment entitlements 
and airline practice, particularly when taking into account 
associated reactionary delay effects, are highly complex, and 
legal advice was thus taken. In summary, the two types of 
disturbance applied, and their associated reactionary delays, do 
not entitle passengers to compensation.  
However, regarding baseline delay, approximately 40% of 
primary delay, and its associated reactionary delay, does fall 
within the eligibility of compensation payments. During 
disruption, within airline alliances, flight rebookings for missed 
connections are calculated using IATA pro-rotation rules. 
Outside such agreements, following a separate airline 
consultation and internal calculations, passengers are rebooked 
at the pro-rated fare, plus 75%. 
G. Model calibration 
To assess the basic validity of the model’s key output 
metrics, the baseline values (i.e. with baseline mechanisms but 
without the explicit disturbances) are compared with published 
values. These are shown to be in good agreement, in Table IV. 
TABLE IV.  DELAY CALIBRATION METRICS  
Metric Calibration target Model baseline 
Flight departure delay 
(mins/flight) 
10.7a 10.2 






Cost of delay 
(Euros/flight) 103
b  104 
a. All European Civil Aviation Conference traffic, September 2014 [21]. 
b. All European Civil Aviation Conference traffic, full year 2014 [17]. 
(Values to 3 s.f.) 
Regarding the passenger allocations described in Section 
III(B), the overall passenger load factor for the baseline traffic 
day was 83.5%. This compares well with the Association of 
European Airlines’ ‘total scheduled’ load factor for the month, 
83.6% [24].  
Other calibration checks using ACI EUROPE statistics5 
showed total, model-allocated passengers at the busiest ten 
airports to be slightly higher, but within 6% of ACI figures. 
The top 100 airports were all within 11%. 
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS 
A. Comparative cost resilience results 














With early adopters 5 000 – 11 300 0 
With followers 16 400 – 53 100 – 
(Costs in k Euros; 3 s.f.) 
                                                          
5 Personal communication; adjusted to one day of traffic. 












With early adopters 2 500 – 3 800 – 
With followers 20 000 – 17 900 – 
* Costs are assigned per disturbance type; values shown in table are averages over disturbance types. 
(Costs in Euros; 3 s.f.) 
Table V shows selected strategic costs of the investment 
mechanisms, as described in Section III(D)3. These are the 
implementation costs of the mechanisms. Note that the ‘with 
followers’ costs include the ‘early adopters’ costs, as these are 
assessed in the model against the total benefit of the early 
adopters and followers. Costs indicated ‘–’ cannot be shown 
due to commercial sensitivity6. Those for DCI are comparable 
with the improved sector capacities and A-CDM values. The 
improved passenger reaccommodation value for the followers 
is lower than other values in the same row; the corresponding 
early adopter value is zero, as discussed earlier. 
Those tactical costs shown in Table VI are the ‘running’ 
costs of the mechanisms for the (single) simulation day. Apart 
from DCI, the tactical costs for these mechanisms are 
calculated in advance. In practice, (relatively small) 
adjustments could be made tactically based on more flexible 
ATCO payments, to A-CDM costs and passengers’ boarded 
(for the reaccommodation tool costs), but the pre-simulation 
estimates are believed to be robust.  
In contrast, the DCI tactical costs are derived directly from 
the savings made by the airlines, and are thus calculated 
dynamically. Although, again, costs indicated ‘–’ cannot be 
shown due to commercial sensitivity6, the DCI values (in each 
row) are similar to the improved sector capacity and A-CDM 
costs, being somewhat lower for the followers (but of the same 
order of magnitude). The passenger reaccommodation tool 
running costs are the highest in each row, but remain 
comparable with the others. 
Of note, is that the DCI costs fall (averaged over all 
scenarios) by around 10% between the nominal and high cost 
fuel cases. This is because fuel burn falls by the same amount, 
as the number of occasions when it becomes cost effective to 
speed up to recover delay decreases with the higher fuel cost. 
The implications for the RC values will be discussed later. 
Table VII and Table VIII show the results of the RC values 
calculated for the 40 scenarios introduced in Section I. The 
values are shown in pairs, i.e. for local and disperse 
disturbances, for each combination of stakeholder uptake and 
mechanism.  
Firstly, we note that the local and disperse values are 
comparable in each case, demonstrating that the formulation of 
RC (2) is effectively capturing the comparative effects of the 
mechanisms relative to the respective baselines.  
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TABLE VII.  COST RESILIENCE UNDER INDUSTRIAL ACTION DISTURBANCE 
Mechanism, by 
stakeholder uptake 













With early adopters 
local 0.038 0.020 0.019 0.008 0.024 
disperse 0.049 0.017 0.016 0.004 0.021 
 
With followers 
local 0.237 0.056 0.064 0.007 0.008 
disperse 0.271 0.058 0.067 0.004 0.009 
(All values relate to n = 26 860 flights.) 
 
TABLE VIII.  COST RESILIENCE UNDER WEATHER DISTURBANCE 
Mechanism, by 
stakeholder uptake 













With early adopters 
local 0.027 0.008 0.016 0.002 0.000 
disperse 0.020 0.002 0.010 0.012 0.004 
 
With followers 
local 0.210 0.053 0.064 0.002 -0.000a 
disperse 0.211 0.044 0.057 -0.000a 0.005 
a. Adjusted from small negative values statistically equivalent to zero. 
(All values relate to n = 26 860 flights.) 
Comparing the early adopter values (upper two rows in 
each table) with the corresponding followers (lower two rows 
in the same tables), it is apparent that the improved sector 
capacity and DCI mechanisms offer notably increased cost 
resilience as the scope of the mechanism (stakeholder uptake) 
is increased. This is not apparent for the A-CDM or improved 
passenger reaccommodation mechanisms. The rationale for this 
is likely to be attributable to the relative colocation of the 
disturbances and mechanisms. The improved sector capacity 
provisions are typically close to the disturbances, and the DCI 
mechanism is fairly widespread through the network. Initial 
analyses suggest that the positive effects of A-CDM are less 
well colocated with the disturbances in terms of having a 
notable amelioratory impact. This is less likely to be the reason 
for the lower values for the passenger reaccommodation tool, 
since its spatial implementation mimics that of DCI, as 
explained earlier: we will thus return to these lower values. 
By the time the follower stakeholder uptake is incorporated 
into the model, it is notable that the RC values for each 
mechanism are very similar when comparing the industrial 
action and weather disturbances. This levelling effect is as 
expected, as the location of the early adopters becomes less of 
a factor relative to the disturbances (and the delay subsequently 
propagated more widely through the network as reactionary 
delay) as the mechanism uptake becomes more widespread. 
Also of note is that the RC values appear overall to be 
relatively low in magnitude. Further research would be 
required to investigate these values under different conditions 
and modelling assumptions, although none of the values is 
close to the upper limit of unity (perfect cost resilience). It 
should be borne in mind, however, that the values are 
summated over a wide network area and many flights, yet they 
still seem to behave logically and sensitively. Of particular 
interest in further work, would be to examine more localised 
cost resilience values, for example with widespread disruption 
in one airspace region (or state), and applying specifically to 
more highly impacted flights, or flights passing through that 
region. It would then be expected that the cost resilience values 
would all increase markedly. 
Before concluding this summary of the RC results, it is 
worth being reminded of the fact that the DCI and passenger 
reaccommodation mechanisms are, to a certain extent, self-
determining with respect to their cost resilience, since both 
mechanisms are charged to the airspace user relative to their 
efficacy and usage, respectively, as described in Section 
III(D)3. The low passenger reaccommodation RC values are 
discussed in the next section. Addressing the DCI values, as 
observed in the previous section, these costs fall by around 
10% between the nominal and high cost fuel cases. However, 
the RC values are fairly stable across these cases, i.e. within 
given rows. This is because the mechanism is here actively 
trading off the cost-benefit of speeding up to recover delay, and 
there is a consistent fall (of around 5%) in the cost of delay 
between the nominal and high cost fuel cases.  
B. Resilience in the context of disaggregated metrics 
In this section we explore further the high-level cost 
resilience (RC) results, through the use of a small selection of 
the dedicated metrics evaluated for each of the scenario and 
baseline runs. These include flight-centric and passenger-
centric metrics, as it is necessary to differentiate between the 
two, as established in the literature (see [6] for European 
examples, and a literature review). The cost-centric metrics 
also draw on [17].  
The selection of results presented in Table IX will are 
referred to by the corresponding row numbers, and standard z 
tests are applied to assess the statistical significance of 
differences (in each case, the minimum number of flights 
included is 26 860). These values are also aggregated over all 
scenarios for each mechanism, to furnish a convenient 
overview of performance. In further reporting, such analyses 
will be disaggregated by disturbance type and stakeholder 
uptake, building on the corresponding observations of Section 
IV(A).  
Of initial note is that the key metrics of Table IV are 
significantly deteriorated, as expected, in Table IX, i.e. under 
the influence of the explicit disturbances applied. Considering 
the average flight arrival delays (a), the improved sector 
capacities mechanism performs better than the other four 
(p = 0.00, x4). The two DCI fuel cases are statistically the same 
(p = 0.89), but perform somewhat better than A-CDM7. A-
CDM, in turn, produces a flight arrival delay significantly 
lower than the passenger reaccommodation mechanism 
(p = 0.03). The clear performer here, however, is once again 
the improved sector capacity mechanism, with the other four 
producing essentially similar results. 
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Flight arrival delay 
(mins/flight) 14.9 17.3 17.2 17.8 18.4 
(b) 
Pax arrival delay 
(mins/pax) 25.1 27.9 27.8 28.3 28.4 
(c) 
Pax / flight delay 
(ratio: a / b) 1.69 1.61 1.61 1.59 1.55 
(d) 
Cost of delay 
(Euros/flight) 
287 318 316 328 328 
(e) 
Reactionary delay 
(reactionary/total %) 44.2 44.9 44.8 45.7 47.4 
(f) 
Airborne fuel burn 
(tonnes/flight) 8.94 8.45 8.45 8.93 8.93 
(g) 
Airborne CO2 
(tonnes/flight) 28.3 26.7 26.7 28.2 28.2 
 (Values to 3 s.f.) 
The average passenger arrival delays (b) are in the same 
order, across the mechanisms, as the flight arrival delays, 
although the distribution is a little flatter. However, the 
standard deviation of these means (not shown) are considerably 
higher than those of the flight delays, consistent with 
observations that passenger delay distributions are typically 
much wider than those of flights [6]. As a consequence of this, 
there is no significant difference (p > 0.55, x6) in performance 
between any pairs of mechanisms for the four mechanisms in 
the right-hand side of the table. In other words, only improved 
sector capacities out-performs other mechanisms in this respect 
(p < 0.01, x4). These statistical significance patterns are exactly 
reflected for the costs of delay (d), such that the improved 
sector capacities mechanism offers, on average, across all the 
scenarios and compared with the other mechanisms, an extra 
total cost saving to the airlines of approximately EUR 930k 
during this busy traffic day. 
In row (c), the ratio of the passenger to flight arrival delay 
is shown. Lower values indicate relative better performance in 
managing passenger delay. As might be expected, the 
passenger reaccommodation mechanism shows the best ratio 
(1.55). These values are in agreement with similar ratios 
previously reported [6] in the European context for the ratio of 
arrival-delayed passenger over arrival-delayed flight minutes 
(1.3 – 1.9), these tending to be higher, as might be expected, 
under greater disturbance. 
The reactionary delay values (e) offer some insight into 
other performance characteristics of the passenger 
reaccommodation mechanism. Here, it is likely that the cost-
based local rebooking (early adopters), then extended wait 
rules for passengers (followers), suffer from negative impacts 
further ‘downstream’ (on subsequent rotations) during the 
operational day. Decisions, as modelled, such as to wait for 
passengers, are locally good, but globally do not offer the 
expected benefits, for example due to delays being 
subsequently compounded by further ATFM regulations being 
applied. This is partly manifested by the highest reactionary 
delay ratio (47.4%) occurring for this mechanism. This 
presents particular further opportunities for exploring these 
impacts in the network. Higher reactionary ratios for 
passenger-oriented solutions were also reported in [6], as an 
expected consequence of waiting aircraft. It is also to be noted 
that this is the major reason for the low RC values reported 
earlier for this mechanism: these RC values are robust with 
respect to the assumed tactical costs and change relatively little 
if these are revised significantly downwards. 
Regarding the average airborne fuel burn (f), it is 
interesting to note that the cross-scenario average of 8.45 
tonnes/flight increases to 8.82 tonnes/flight (not shown) for 
both DCI fuel cost cases when only the early adopters are 
included. In other words, it is the extension to the follower 
cases that brings the average fuel burn down to below those of 
the other mechanisms, as we might expect from the mechanism 
with greatest specific focus on ‘smart’ fuel consumption. The 
airborne CO2 (g) is a linear function of the fuel burn (f), as 
described earlier, and is included in the table to directly show 
the comparative outputs. For example, based on the 26 860 
flights, DCI (under either cost assumption) produces 
approximately 40 kilotonnes less airborne CO2 in the network 
during the busy simulation day relative to improved sector 
capacities8 (p = 0.00, x2), yet still performs comparably well in 
(a) and (b), as discussed. 
C. Taking account of the strategic investments 














With early adopters 1 6 5 10 (1a) ≈ 0 
With followers < 1 4 3 (5a) 2 
a. Based on airline implementation costs – see main text. 
(Cost recovery periods to nearest traffic-adjusted, high-disturbance month.) 
Table X shows indicative cost recovery periods for the 
mechanisms investigated. These basic values are subject to 
refinement during further model scenarios, in particular 
investigating biases introduced due to the colocation, or 
separation, of the disturbances and mechanisms. These highly 
simplified payback periods, illustrating the future potential of 
the model, are calculated by simply dividing the 
implementation costs of Table V, by the net cost savings of 
each mechanism, averaged over all the disturbances. These are 
not calculated in time-discounted Euros and assume that all the 
days in which the mechanism applies experience the same high 
levels of explicit disturbance. The values are proportionally 
corrected, however, for the fact that the sample day had 
relatively higher traffic than a typical day, such that we might 
expect recovery over lower-volume traffic days to take longer.  
With these several caveats in mind, it is apparent that the 
improved sector capacities mechanism offers rapid payback, as 
does the passenger reaccommodation mechanism. For the 
latter, the cost recovery for the early adopters is of course 
effectively instantaneous, since the software upgrade was 
assumed in the model to be made on the basis of tactical 
recovery costs only. With full implementation costs involved 
for the followers, and running costs based on passengers 
                                                          
8 Or any other mechanism, since the non-DCI values in row (f) are 
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boarded, the recovery period (in terms of high-disturbance 
months, it is again stressed) is still quite low.  
DCI recovery periods are comparable in order of 
magnitude, with the slightly lower values for the higher fuel 
cost case reflecting its corresponding somewhat superior cost 
efficiency, as reflected in the majority of the RC values. The A-
CDM value of 10 months is artificially high for two reasons. 
Firstly, it is biased by the colocation issue. Secondly, the 
implementation costs are borne largely by non-airline 
stakeholders, whereas the benefit is calculated only as a delay 
saving to the airlines (note that this is also the case with the 
improved sector capacities). The A-CDM values shown in 
parenthesis are for airline strategic (implementation) costs (not 
shown). These produce payback results comparable with the 
other mechanisms. (The value for the followers based on Table 
V was excessively large and is not shown.) 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Using traffic and passenger itinerary data for the whole 
European network, the cost resilience of four mechanisms, with 
phased stakeholder uptake, has been assessed under local and 
disperse disturbance. In the only model of its kind, as far as the 
authors are aware, a novel cost resilience metric has 
demonstrated logical properties and captured cost impacts 
sensitively. We have compared and contrasted the cost benefits 
of the four diverse mechanisms. Of these, only A-CDM has 
been assessed within the SESAR context, yet each of the other 
three demonstrates particular strengths. It would be instructive 
to explore these further.  
Several features of the model may be improved upon, 
particularly the downstream behaviour of the passenger 
reaccommodation mechanism, and colocation effects. In 
addition, higher specification of the disturbances and the 
construction of a wider sample of traffic and passenger 
itinerary inputs would be useful. Enhanced airline behaviours 
(e.g. tactical responses to industrial action and strategic 
responses to changes in Regulation 261) could also be 
included. As mentioned, of particular value would be to 
explore more localised cost resilience values, and to examine 
the results to date in more detail using further flight-, 
passenger- and cost-centric metrics: of those deployed in the 
model, only a small selection has been used here. There is also 
an opportunity, probably a necessity, to use advanced data 
visualisation tools to more comprehensively map the large data 
outputs from each scenario. Initially promising work on 
payback periods has begun, with opportunities to broaden the 
included stakeholder costs and to assess cost recovery periods 
over more typical operational days. Despite uncertainty being 
one of the main factors generating reduced performance, 
behaviours are often driven by complex interactions and 
feedback loops that render it difficult to assess second-order 
impacts at a network level. Feedback loops in the model could 
thus potentially generate new emergent macroscopic 
behaviour, and analysis thereof is a key next step towards the 
goal of improved cost-benefit analysis in ATM. 
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